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I. Introduction
Antiterrorism intelligence sharing across national borders has been
trumpeted as one of the most promising forms of networked global gov1
ernance. By exchanging information across the world, government
agencies can catch terrorists and other dangerous criminals. Yet this new
form of global governance is also one of the most dangerous. Even at the
domestic level, secrecy and national security imperatives have placed
intelligence agencies largely beyond legal and democratic oversight. But
at the global level, accountability is missing entirely. Global cooperation
among national intelligence agencies is extraordinarily opaque. The nature of the international system compounds the problem: these actors do
not operate within a robust institutional framework of liberal democracy
and human rights. Safeguarding rights in the transnational realm when
governments conspire to spy, detain, interrogate, and arrest is no easy
matter.
Privacy is one of the most critical liberal rights to come under
pressure from transnational intelligence gathering. This Article explores
the many ways in which transnational intelligence networks intrude upon
privacy and considers some of the possible forms of legal redress. Part II
lays bare the different types of transnational intelligence networks that
exist today. Part III begins the analysis of the privacy problem by
examining the national level, where, over the past forty years, a legal
framework has been developed to promote the right to privacy in domestic
*
Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
1.
Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning Without
War 32, 119 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 1–2 (2004).
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intelligence gathering. Part IV turns to the privacy problem
transnationally, when government agencies exchange intelligence across
national borders. Part V invokes the cause célèbre of Maher Arar, a
Canadian national, to illustrate the disastrous consequences of privacy
breaches in this networked world of intelligence gathering. Acting upon
inaccurate and misleading intelligence provided by the Canadian
government, the United States wrongfully deported Arar to Syria, where
he was tortured and held captive by the Syrian Military Intelligence
Service for nearly one year.
Part VI begins the constructive project of redesigning transnational
networks to defend the right to privacy, with the safeguards of European
intelligence and police networks serving as inspiration for transnational
networks more broadly. These European systems feature two types of
privacy safeguards: multilateral standards, to which all network parties
must adhere, and unilateral standards, applicable under the law of one
network party and enforced against the others through the refusal to
share intelligence with sub-standard parties. Moving to the global realm,
this Article concludes that the multilateral avenue is more promising
than the unilateral one. Multilateral standards require consensus on
common privacy norms, and consensus will be difficult to achieve. Notwithstanding this hurdle, multilateral privacy standards are crucial, for
they will both enable the cooperation necessary to fight serious transnational crime and provide for vigorous protection of basic liberal rights.

II. Types of Transnational Intelligence Networks
Transnational networks are quickly becoming one of the most common forms of international cooperation, alongside classic international
organizations and treaty regimes. In such networks, national officials
representing distinct regulatory communities, such as environmental protection and financial markets, come together to address common crossborder problems.2 They do so through a variety of formal and informal
techniques: information exchange on best practices, promulgation of
standardized regulation, and mutual assistance in enforcing that regulation. As compared to more traditional forms of international cooperation,
transnational networks are more flexible and informal and therefore can
adapt more readily to changing circumstances.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, transnational networks
have assumed an ever-growing importance in the national security arena.
Intelligence-sharing networks draw on many different government enti2.

Slaughter, supra note 1, at 2–5.

BIGNAMI FINAL PAGINATED TYPE.DOC

Spring 2007]

Towards a Right to Privacy

5/30/2007 9:09 AM

665

ties: foreign and domestic intelligence agencies, police, customs officials, immigration agencies, and financial regulators. Intelligencesharing networks also come in many different geographical constellations. Some, like the intelligence-sharing agreement between the United
States and Canada discussed in Part V, are bilateral; others are regional,
such as the European Police Office (Europol); and still others, like the
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), are truly global.
Despite such variation, these systems share two critical attributes:
their purpose and the institutional means chosen to accomplish it. Each
network deploys a decentralized, transnational government process to
fight terrorism and other forms of serious crime. A national agency—one
node in the network—gathers the information. Another national
agency—a different node in the network—acts upon the information.
Such government action can take a number of different forms: further
information gathering through surveillance and other investigative techniques, asset seizure, arrest, deportation, and prosecution. The network
form of governance is quite obviously designed to match the fluid, borderless nature of the problem at hand; terrorism, drug trafficking, and
other forms of serious crime generally involve individuals and funds in
multiple countries that can move quickly from one jurisdiction to another.
For purposes of understanding the rights implications of networked
global governance, the most significant difference separating intelligence
networks is the degree to which the network is centrally coordinated. At
one extreme, the only coordination mechanism is an agreement among
the different participants on the terms of cooperation. One example discussed in greater detail in Part V is the information-sharing arrangement
established between Canadian and U.S. intelligence agencies in the days
following the September 11 attacks. Under this purely verbal agreement,
intelligence was to be exchanged in “real time” through direct communication among the various agencies involved.3 Another example is a
recent European Union (EU) law on information sharing between law
4
enforcement authorities in the member states. The law facilitates information exchange by setting down a common procedure through which
national police may request information from other national police, establishing a duty to cooperate with such requests, listing an exhaustive
set of reasons for denying cooperation, and specifying response times for
replying to information requests. Because only the national agencies in
3.
Comm’n of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to
Maher Arar, I Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual Background, 31 (2006) [hereinafter Arar Commission: Factual Background I].
4.
Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA, 2006 O.J. (L 386) 89 (EC).
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the network exercise public power, rights serve to protect exclusively
against intrusive action by those national agencies.
At the other extreme of the coordination spectrum, a central secretariat is entrusted with significant responsibility for collecting
information from network participants, analyzing that information, and
then retransmitting the (improved) information to network participants.
Europol is one such intelligence network.5 Located in The Hague, Europol is responsible for assisting the member states in combating a wide
array of cross-border crime, including terrorism, counterfeiting, drug
trafficking, smuggling of illegal immigrants, and motor vehicle crime.6 It
manages three related criminal intelligence systems: the Europol Information System, work analysis files, and an index system.
The Europol Information System (EIS) is largely designed to facilitate information exchange among national authorities, who supply
information on individuals suspected of having committed, or planning
to commit, one of the covered crimes. National authorities then extract
information from the system in the course of national investigations involving a covered crime. The central office, however, also bears
responsibilities for the EIS. It both manages EIS-related technology and
solicits information from national police units to ensure that the system
is complete.7 The central office is also a consumer of the EIS. It consults
the system to conduct long-term strategic analyses on different types of
crime, which are then circulated to national police forces.8 The central
office can also use the system in connection with specific national investigations: one of its tasks is to assist with national criminal investigations
by collecting and analyzing intelligence from the many different jurisdictions potentially involved in the crime, some of which is extracted
9
directly from the EIS. This criminal intelligence is stored in so-called
work files and is also cross-referenced in an index system to permit easier access to the intelligence for purposes of related investigations.
Clearly, Europol is not a federal police force10 but rather a network of
national police forces. Nevertheless, it is a network in which the center—
the office in The Hague—is charged with significant responsibilities, all
5.
Convention Based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the Establishment of a European Police Office, 1995 O.J. (C 316) 2 [hereinafter Europol Convention].
6.
See, e.g., Steven Peers, Europol: The final step in the creation of an “Investigative
and Operational” European Police Force, Jan. 2007, at 2–3, http://www.statewatch.org/news/
2007/jan/europol-analysis.pdf.
7.
Europol Convention, supra note 5, arts. 3.1(2), 8.
8.
Id. art. 3.2.
9.
See Summaries of the Union’s Legislation: Europol: European Police Office, http://
europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l14005b.htm.
10.
A number of proposed changes to Europol’s legal framework, however, might bring
it closer to the federal model. See Peers, supra note 6, at 4–6.
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with the aim of improving the information available through the network. Because of these powers, rights must be guaranteed both centrally
and nationally.
Between these two extremes on the coordination spectrum lie networks with a central component performing only ministerial tasks for the
participating states. In such networks, a free-standing government body
can be charged with receiving information from and distributing information to national actors, but without responsibility for conducting an
independent analysis of the information. In this type of arrangement, the
central body does not actively seek intelligence from the participating
states, scrutinize that intelligence to guarantee its accuracy, or assess its
relevance for crime-fighting purposes. Because the powers of the center
are relatively insignificant, the need for an additional layer of rights to
complement national guarantees is less pressing.
The Schengen Information System exemplifies this intermediary form
of network.11 A small group of European states signed the Schengen Convention in 1985 to manage jointly the admission of foreign citizens to their
territories. As part of the Convention, a common database was created to
monitor foreigners admitted to the Schengen area with Schengen visas.
Today, this database functions as an all-purpose, cross-border crime database, containing information on, among other things, individuals
suspected of having committed serious crimes, extradition warrants, car
thefts, and passport theft or loss. The Schengen Information System is
located and maintained in Strasbourg, but national police enter and extract information from the system entirely independently of the
Strasbourg office. Unlike Europol’s office in The Hague, the Strasbourg
office lacks control over the information contained in its database; neither does it have the power to assist national authorities with their
investigations by soliciting and analyzing information held by other national authorities.

III. Privacy in Domestic Intelligence Gathering
One of the most fundamental rights at issue in intelligence-gathering
activities is information privacy. The right to privacy limits the government’s use of personal information, thereby protecting individuals against
a wide array of abuses of government power. Perhaps the most obvious of
these abuses, especially in intelligence operations, are deprivations of life,
11.
Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany
and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, June
19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 68 (1991).
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liberty, and property based on inaccurate information. Because of the
ease with which data can be gathered, stored, and combined in the age of
information technology, it is difficult to guarantee its accuracy. At the
most basic level, data might be wrongly recorded through human error.
When different data sets are combined, the information in one of the data
sets may be wrongly interpreted because its coding and software systems
differ from the other data set’s systems. Moreover, the storage capacity
of computer systems is so vast that information that has become obsolete, and therefore inaccurate, can be retained indefinitely.
The questionable quality of such data is particularly troubling in the
domains of national security and law enforcement, in which reliance on
inaccurate data can lead to wrongful surveillance, detention, deportation,
prosecution, and even conviction. Many consider the right to procedural
due process to be the primary guarantee against wrongful government
determinations. Yet many of the harms caused by the government’s use
of bad information are kept secret. For instance, if such information
gives rise to the belief that an individual is involved in a terrorist conspiracy, further surveillance will be conducted without alerting that
individual. Other harms that result from inaccurate information are not
legally recognized as constituting determinations against which individuals have recourse. Again, surveillance is a good example. Even if an
individual is fully aware that she is being observed by the police, unless
that observation rises to the level of harassment, she has no remedy.
There is no procedure available to her for proving that the suspicions of
the police are unfounded. By limiting the personal information that can
be collected and by requiring accuracy when such information is collected, the right to privacy operates as a critical ex ante guarantee against
such government harms.
Information about others can also be put to all sorts of illegitimate
uses. An intelligence agency, of course, can legitimately use personal
information to prevent terrorism. But if care is not taken, such information can also be used to suppress speech and political protest, as
occurred in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. Discrimination based on religion, race, or ethnic origin is another illegitimate use of
knowledge of others. Given that much of today’s terrorism originates in
the Islamic world, both of these speech and discrimination concerns are
implicated. Intelligence operations may target certain individuals based
on their religion and country of origin rather than on actual facts connecting them to terrorist plots. Or critics of the U.S. presence in the
Middle East might come under investigation, even though they neither
explicitly encourage acts of violence nor serve as a cover for terrorist
groups. Distinguishing between legitimate suspicion and illegitimate
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discrimination and suppression of speech is often impossible, as terrorism can be associated with religious beliefs and critical speech. By
limiting the information on ordinary individuals available to government
investigators, privacy can defend against such abuses.
Even more fundamental to privacy are the principles of human dignity and individual autonomy.12 At the core of liberalism is the free,
equal, rational person capable of choosing her own life projects. Critical
to this liberal being is the power to keep certain matters private and to
make other matters public. The duty of others, in a liberal society, is to
respect the individual’s decision in favor of privacy. Yet when government agencies collect, combine, and manipulate information on
individuals without their consent, they breach that essential liberal duty.
The government is guilty of the high-technology equivalent of gazing at
citizens without their consent.
Intelligence agencies, of course, routinely conduct intrusive, unrelenting surveillance. They are allowed this extraordinary privilege in
liberal societies because such surveillance supports the critical mission
of guaranteeing the survival of society in the face of threats to national
security. When, however, surveillance is no longer used to protect national security and begins to serve more mundane public purposes, for
instance preventing ordinary crimes like bank fraud, liberty is put at risk.
To safeguard privacy interests, most countries have enacted information privacy laws, known in Europe as data protection laws.13 Such laws
specify the conditions under which the government may collect personal
information. Generally, individuals must either consent to the collection
and the intended uses of their information, or a piece of legislation must
14
specify the public reasons for mandating personal data processing.
These laws restrict the amount and type of personal information that
12.
See, e.g., Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in Nomos
XII: Privacy 1 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
13.
This discussion is based on U.S. and European legislation. In the United States, the
relevant law is the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 3, 88 Stat. 1897 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). The Council of Europe Convention on Personal Data
Processing serves as the point of reference for national European laws, since the Convention
has been ratified and implemented by most European countries.
14.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)(3) (2000) (setting forth information that must be disclosed
upon collection); id. § 552(e)(4) (describing publication of notice of records system in the
Federal Register); Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data art. 5a, Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108 [hereinafter Convention 108] (addressing fair and lawful processing of personal data); Bundesdatenschutzgesetz
[Federal Data Protection Act], Dec. 20, 1990, BGBl. I at 2954, § 4(1) (F.R.G.) (“The collection, processing and use of personal data shall be admissible only if permitted or prescribed by
this Act or any other legal provision or if the data subject has consented.”). To be entirely
accurate, absent an authorizing law, European data protection laws require both disclosure of
the purposes of data collection and consent to those purposes, whereas U.S. law requires only
disclosure, not consent.
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15

may be collected, and they limit the time during which personal information may be retained.16 The personal information stored by
17
government agencies must be accurate, reliable, and up-to-date. It may
be put to uses different from those originally contemplated or shared
with other government agencies only if doing so is necessary to fulfill
the original purposes of the data collection or to satisfy imperative public
needs.18 Further, individuals have a right to apply to government agencies
to ensure that information stored in their government files is accurate
19
and that, in every other way, it is being used in accordance with the law.
Enforcement of these privacy guarantees is generally entrusted to an independent privacy agency with the power to hear individual complaints,
initiate investigations, and conduct other forms of oversight.20 The basic
aim driving all of these laws is to ensure that as little personal information as possible is floating about the halls of government, and that the
personal information that absolutely must be stored in government computers is reliable. If only limited amounts of reliable information are
available, the theory goes, abuses of government power are less likely.
Complementing these blanket information privacy laws are laws
regulating specific types of government surveillance considered to be
especially intrusive. In the United States and Europe, these forms of intrusive surveillance include searches of physical premises, wiretaps of
electronic communications, and access to commercial data such as bank

15.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (requiring that personal data be “relevant and necessary”
to the agency’s purposes); id. § 552a(e)(7) (personal data “describing how any individual
exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment” may not be collected routinely); Convention 108, supra note 14, art. 5c (personal data must be “adequate, relevant and not excessive in
relation to the purposes for which they are stored”); id. art. 6 (identifying types of data considered to be sensitive). The types of personal data that may not be collected routinely are more
limited in the United States than in Europe, where information on race, ethnic origin, health
status, and other personal characteristics is protected.
16.
See Convention 108, supra note 14, art. 5e. This is the one privacy guarantee for
which no U.S. equivalent exists.
17.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5); Convention 108, supra note 14, art. 5d.
18.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (personal information may not be shared with other government agencies without the consent of the individual concerned); Convention 108, supra
note 14, art. 5b (personal data is to be used only in accordance with the original purposes of
the collection of such data).
19.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d); Convention 108, supra note 14, art. 8. Under the U.S. Privacy Act, however, individuals only have the right to demand that their information be
corrected—not deleted.
20.
See Colin J. Bennett & Charles D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective 106, 108–09 (2003). This is the only major point
of difference, in the legislative text, between the United States and Europe. In Europe, enforcement is entrusted to such independent agencies, while in the United States, individuals
have the right to sue the government in court for privacy violations.
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21

and calling records. Such surveillance is authorized for law enforcement and intelligence purposes. But the preconditions for collecting
personal information are particularly stringent: the government must
demonstrate (1) that the information relates to an individual believed to
have committed a crime—or in national security cases, an individual
who is plotting to do so—and (2) that such information will help prove
these claims. This showing must generally be made to an independent
magistrate or to an executive official not directly involved in the investigation. Once surveillance is authorized, the accuracy of personal
information, and the individual’s right to challenge such information, is
guaranteed mostly through the law of criminal procedure.
The blanket information privacy laws described earlier generally apply to all government bodies, including police and intelligence agencies.
Yet these agencies benefit from significant exemptions given the critical
nature of their crime-fighting and national security missions and the importance of personal information—and keeping personal information
secret—to accomplishing their missions. Turning to surveillance-specific
laws, different standards are created for different types of government
activities. Tougher standards are imposed on the police than on intelligence officers because of the different nature and impact of the two
types of government action. Whereas the police investigate a concrete set
of past events potentially leading to criminal convictions of the objects
of surveillance, intelligence officers monitor an inchoate set of individuals and events that might, at some future date, pose a threat to national
security. The primary purpose of such intelligence surveillance is disrupting terrorist plots rather than bringing prosecutions.
The extent to which law enforcement and intelligence agencies
benefit from double standards, however, varies considerably from one
country to another. The main differences between Europe and the United
States concern the type of information that may be collected, the uses
that may be made of such information, and the right of access to such
information.

21.
On the U.S. side, the principal law on police surveillance is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2711, 3121–3127 (2000), and
the principal law on intelligence-related surveillance is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1862. In Europe, regulation of the police and intelligence agencies is
mostly national. To take the German example, the standards applicable to the police are contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure while those applicable to Germany’s domestic and
foreign intelligence agencies are contained in the G10 Law of 1968. Gesetz zur
Beschraenkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses—Gesetz zu Artikel 10 des
Grundgesetzes [Law Restricting the Secrecy of Correspondence of Letters, Mail and Telecommunications—Law Applying to Article 10 of the Constitution], Aug. 13, 1968, BGBl. I at
949 (F.R.G.).
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The law in the United States stringently regulates the collection of
certain types of information by both police and intelligence officers—for
instance what is said in a telephone conversation. The use of such information, however, is not comprehensively regulated, and indeed, since the
September 11 attacks, police and intelligence agencies have come under
heavy pressure to make wider use of information connected in any way
to terrorism through information sharing.22 Nor is there an individual
right to check such information for accuracy unless it is used as part of a
criminal or other legal proceeding. Furthermore, in the United States,
unless personal information is covered by one of the surveillancespecific statutes, its collection and use goes almost entirely unregulated.
That is because of the numerous exceptions for law enforcement and
intelligence activities under the Privacy Act.23 True, most federal agencies do have guidelines that impose general restrictions on intelligence
gathering. These guidelines, however, are not enforceable in the courts
and, as with privacy legislation, they focus on collection rather than subsequent use and transfer of intelligence.24
In Europe, by contrast, the government’s access to and use of personal information is regulated as a personal data processing continuum
in which no stage is considered more or less harmful than the next.25 Privacy rights apply throughout. Moreover, privacy principles cover all
personal information, as opposed to only certain types of especially private information gathered with particularly intrusive means. This broader
coverage is a product of constitutional law and blanket data protection
laws. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the European Convention on Human
Rights and national constitutions have been interpreted to confer a right
26
to information privacy. All government agencies and all types of per22.
Compare 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802–1811 (requirements for intelligence-related wiretapping), with 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (restrictions on use of information acquired through
intelligence-related surveillance). The main impetus for information-sharing between members of a broadly defined “intelligence community” came from the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 109-279, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
23.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)–(k) (2007).
24.
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Attorney General’s
Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence
Collection (2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/nsiguidelines.pdf [hereinafter
2003 FBI Guidelines].
25.
See, e.g., Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], Dec. 20, 1990,
BGBl. I at 2954, § 1 (F.R.G.).
26.
Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 005. See, e.g., Rotaru v.
Romania, 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 156 (holding that storage and use of personal information in a
police file, together with the refusal of the right of correction, amounts to interference with
private life under Article 8); Leander v. Sweden, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 124 (1987)
(holding that recording personal details in police files constitutes interference with private life
under Article 8); Malone v. United Kingdom, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 289 (1984) (holding
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sonal information, therefore, are subject to constitutional privacy norms.
And compared to the U.S. Privacy Act, the exceptions for law enforcement and intelligence activities in European data protection laws are
more limited.27

IV. Privacy in Transnational Intelligence Networks
Intelligence sharing across national borders replicates and magnifies
the privacy dangers of personal data processing performed by a single
national government. In the transnational context, the danger of deprivations of life, liberty, or property based on inaccurate information is
particularly acute. Personal information, in another government’s database and organized using a different coding system, is susceptible to
misinterpretation. This is a danger that has long been recognized in
transferring data sets between agencies within a single government. The
so-called practice of data matching—comparing information on an individual in one database with information on that same individual in
another database—has led to many episodes of grave injustice in the
domestic realm. One common example can be found in the area of welfare policing. In many instances, individuals have been struck off welfare
rolls because their income data, collected for purposes different from
those of distributing welfare entitlements, wrongly suggested that they
were no longer eligible for public assistance.28
When such personal information moves not simply from one government agency to another, but from a government agency in one
country to a government agency in another country, the danger of government decisions based on inaccurate information is magnified. These
agencies are even less likely than agencies at the national level to share
the same infrastructure and information technology protocols. And to
repeat, in the intelligence domain, the possible wrongful government
action is particularly grievous: surveillance, interrogation, detention, deportation, prosecution, or even conviction. Transnational intelligence
exchange also triggers the privacy concerns identified earlier. The more
that open registers constitute an interference with private life under Article 8). For the German
case, see Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal
Republic of Germany 323, 324–25 (2d ed. 1997) (Census Act Case), and for the French
case, see CC decision no. 94-352, Jan. 18, 1995, Recs. 2–4 (Loi d’orientation et de programmation relative à la sécurité) and CC decision no. 2004-499DC, July 29, 2004, Rec. 2 (Loi
relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard des traitements de données à caractère personnel).
27.
See, e.g., BGBl. I at 2954, § 19(3); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)–(k).
28.
See Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 707, 718 (1987).
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widely available personal information is, the greater the danger that governments will harass individuals illegitimately based on their political
views, religious beliefs, ethnicity, and so on. The opportunities for oppressive, liberty-destroying government surveillance are also multiplied.
If each national party to a transnational intelligence network adhered
to the privacy guarantees discussed earlier, the dangers of transnational
information exchange would be manageable. Each national node of the
transnational network would guarantee the reliability of personal information and would restrict sharing with other national agencies, thereby
reducing the prospect of wrongful uses of personal information.
In the chaotic international realm, however, not all countries adhere
to privacy norms and other basic liberties. The right to privacy, therefore,
is at the mercy of each and every intelligence agency in the network.
Personal information can be collected by one national agency, used by a
second for conducting surveillance, and transferred to yet a third for
purposes of freezing financial assets or bringing a criminal prosecution.
If only one of these many actors violates the right to privacy, individuals
are at risk of all the harms identified earlier. All the other participating
agencies, though entirely rights-abiding at home, become complicit in
this privacy violation: they either supplied the personal information that
produced the rights breach or they acted upon bad information, thus
compounding the rights breach.

V. The Case of Maher Arar
The recent case of Maher Arar offers a rare insight into what can go
wrong in the secretive world of networked intelligence when the participating government agencies fail to respect privacy. Maher Arar is a
Canadian citizen of Syrian origin who has resided in Canada since he
was a teenager.29 Although he was under surveillance in connection with
a Canadian terrorist investigation, there was, and continues to be, no evi30
dence suggesting he constituted a national security threat. On
September 26, 2002, he was traveling back to Montreal from Tunisia, a
route that took him through John F. Kennedy International Airport in
New York. At the airport, U.S. authorities detained him based on information provided by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.31 The Canadian
29.
Comm’n of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to
Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations 27 (2006) [hereinafter Arar Commission: Analysis and Recommendations].
30.
Id. at 9.
31.
Id. at 30. Since the United States refused to participate in the Canadian inquiry, the
Commission was unable to reach a definitive conclusion on this point. The report states, however, that “[i]t is very likely that, in making the decisions to detain and remove Mr. Arar to
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government subsequently found this information to be inaccurate. A
week later, on October 7, 2002, U.S. authorities deported Arar to Syria
without any warning to the Canadian government. (Arar is also a Syrian
citizen.) According to the deportation order of the Regional Director of
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the evidence “clearly
and unequivocally reflects that Mr. Arar is a member of a foreign terrorist organization, to wit Al Qaeda.”32 Once in Syria, Arar was transferred
to Syrian Military Intelligence, in whose custody he remained for almost
one year. Only on October 5, 2003 was Arar released to the Canadian
consul in Damascus.33 During the first weeks of Arar’s detention he was
tortured.34 Subsequently, according to the report of the Canadian Commission of Inquiry appointed to investigate the events,
[w]hile the physical beatings had ended . . . the conditions of his
imprisonment in the Palestine Branch [of Syrian Military Intelligence] . . . had been abysmal. He had been confined in a tiny
cell with no natural light. He had slept on the floor and endured
disgusting sanitary conditions. Mr. Arar had suffered enor35
mously. He continues to experience the after-effects to this day.
This set of events was the product of a transnational intelligence
network. There is a long history of collaboration between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement agencies. In the days following the September 11 attacks,
however, Canadian and U.S. officials met and verbally agreed to improve
such cooperation with what was known as a “free-flow-of-information
agreement.”36 The agreement abandoned the numerous official protocols
that had retarded or impeded information sharing in the past. Soon afterwards, Arar came to the attention of the RCMP when he was observed
meeting with Abdullah Almalki, the target of a terrorist investigation.
The meeting prompted an investigation of Arar during which Canadian
officials shared information with U.S. authorities pursuant to the earlier
free-flow-of-information agreement. As extensively documented by the
Commission of Inquiry, much of the information on Arar turned out to
be inaccurate and misleading. It was this very information that led the
Syria, the U.S. authorities relied on information about Mr. Arar provided by the RCMP. Although I cannot be certain without the evidence of the American authorities, the evidence
strongly supports this conclusion.” Id.
32.
Jules Lobel, Op-Ed, The Arar Report: The US Should Follow Canada’s Lead, Jurist, Sept. 26, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/09/arar-report-us-should-followcanadas.php.
33.
Arar Commission: Analysis and Recommendations, supra note 29, at 45.
34.
Id. at 32.
35.
Id. at 45.
36.
Arar Commission: Factual Background I, supra note 3, at 38.
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U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service to conclude that Arar was a
member of al Qaeda and to wrongfully deport him to Syria.
Although a complete chronicle of these missteps is beyond the scope
of the current discussion, some specific examples will illustrate the risks
inherent in intelligence sharing. In late October 2001, the RCMP requested both a Canadian and a U.S. border lookout for Arar. In both
requests, the RCMP indicated that Arar was part of a “group of Islamic
Extremist individuals suspected of being linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist
movement,”37 a claim supported only by the observation that Arar and
Almalki had met at a café and had walked together in the rain for twenty
minutes. Although the Commission of Inquiry agreed that the request for
a border lookout was reasonable, it deemed the identification of Arar
with al Qaeda “inaccurate and potentially inflammatory.” Later, as
chronicled by the Commission of Inquiry,
Project A-O Canada [the RCMP division responsible for the
Arar investigation] provided documents to the American agencies that variously described Mr. Arar as a suspect, a target, a
principal subject of its investigation, a person with an “important” connection to Mr. Almalki, a person directly linked to Mr.
Almalki in a diagram titled “Bin Laden’s Associates: Al Qaeda
Organization in Ottawa,” and a business associate or a close associate of Mr. Almalki.
These descriptions were either completely inaccurate or, at a
minimum, tended to overstate Mr. Arar’s importance in the Project A-O Canada investigation. I repeat that Project A-O
Canada’s view was that Mr. Arar was never a suspect—he was
merely a person of interest. While it might be that, in meetings,
the Project’s officers communicated this actual view of Mr.
Arar’s status in the investigation, there was no justification for
the improper and unfair labels attached to him in written documents.38
In the hands of the U.S. authorities, these inaccurate and unfair labels
had consequences that were entirely unforeseen by the Canadian officers
at the time the intelligence was originally gathered.
On the Canadian side, much of the blame for this disastrous chain of
events rests with the post-September 11 free-flow-of-information agreement. In that agreement, the RCMP abandoned the privacy policies that
ordinarily would have governed national security investigations. These
official policies seek to assure the reliability of personal information and
37.
38.

Arar Commission: Analysis and Recommendations, supra note 29, at 20–21.
Id. at 25.
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to restrict the sharing of such information—aims that should be familiar
from the earlier discussion of privacy harms and legal remedies. In theory, whenever the RCMP gathers information in national security
investigations, it must be assessed and rated for reliability on a scale of
“reliable,” “believed reliable,” “unknown reliability,” or “doubtful reliability.”39 When sharing such information with other agencies, the
reliability rating must be attached. In addition, classified information—
which includes practically all the information gathered in a national security investigation—may be shared with other agencies only on a
“need-to-know basis.” In other words, the officers involved must be satisfied that such information will assist with an ongoing investigation
before releasing it. If a decision is made to share classified information
with other agencies, domestic or foreign, the information must contain a
written “caveat.” That caveat prohibits the receiving agency from sharing
the information without the consent of the RCMP and, in those instances
in which the information is transferred to a foreign agency, limits the use
of the information to the “intelligence community” of the foreign country.40
Because of the post-September 11 decision to dispense with standard
privacy protocols, there were none of the red flags that ordinarily would
have signaled the highly dubious connection between Arar and extremist
terrorism. The Canadians failed to indicate the low reliability of the intelligence on Arar. They further failed to communicate that the
information was to be used only by the U.S. intelligence community, not
by a U.S. immigration agency with the power to detain and deport individuals.
The blame naturally does not rest entirely with the Canadian node of
the transnational intelligence network. On the U.S. side too, privacy law
failed. As explained earlier, when an intelligence agency uses personal
information like Arar’s, it is entirely free of the legal requirements imposed by the U.S. Privacy Act. Like the Canadian RCMP, U.S. intelligence
agencies are governed by internal privacy policies. The officers from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) responsible for Arar’s case would
have been covered by the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign
Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigation (the
Guidelines), replaced in 2003 by a modified set of guidelines.41 Of course,
the Guidelines might have been suspended or modified following the
September 11 attacks. But even if the Guidelines had been fully operative, it does not appear that the information privacy lapses would have
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 324.
Arar Commission: Factual Background I, supra note 3, at 31.
See generally 2003 FBI Guidelines, supra note 24.
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been caught. Both the pre- and post-2003 versions of the Guidelines focus largely on limiting the circumstances under which information may
be collected. What happens to that information after collection receives
little attention. Thus, the Guidelines impose no duty to ensure information reliability or to code such information based on different levels of
reliability, as required by the Canadian system.42
The Guidelines do regulate the sharing of personal information with
other federal and state agencies, albeit less so today than under the pre2003 version. But even the more robust sharing restrictions contained in
the pre-2003 Guidelines would not have applied to Arar: only U.S. citizens and permanent residents of the United States are covered and
therefore, even under the pre-2003 Guidelines, information on Arar
could have been used “for any lawful purpose.”43 The intelligence officers responsible for Arar’s deportation, therefore, were under no duty to
verify independently that the Canadian intelligence was reliable. Nor
were they required to refrain from communicating sketchy intelligence
to powerful law enforcement and immigration agencies.44
Of course, privacy was not the only right the U.S. node of the
45
transnational intelligence network violated. Rather than bring a
42.
Recently, however, the reliability requirement has been adopted as part of another
set of guidelines applicable to the entire intelligence community, including the FBI. See Program Manager, Info. Sharing Env’t, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence,
Guidelines to Ensure that the Information Privacy and Other Legal Rights of
Americans are Protected in the Development and Use of the Information Sharing
Environment 5 (2006), available at http://www.ise.gov/docs/ise%20privacy%20guidelines%
2012-4-06.pdf.
43.
Attorney Gen., Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and
Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations 25 (1995), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/agency/doj/fbi/terrorismintel2.pdf.
44.
Indeed, since September 11, intelligence officers are under the reverse duty: they
must freely share terrorism-related intelligence with all members of the intelligence community. The intelligence community is comprised of intelligence, law enforcement, and
immigration agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
45.
Interpol provides an illustration of these same privacy harms in the context of a
multilateral, as opposed to bilateral, network. See About Interpol, http://www.interpol.int/
public/icpo/default.asp. Interpol is an international police organization charged with, among
other things, managing a system of international notices for its 186 member states. This system enables member countries to issue notices requesting the arrest of wanted individuals,
information on criminal suspects, the identification of missing persons, and other types of
action in the organization’s other member countries. Interpol is responsible for communicating
these notices to national police, and although national police are not legally bound to comply,
they very often do take the requested action.
In a number of cases, member governments have abused the system by posting arrest notices for individuals wanted not for their criminal acts but for their political views, causing
these individuals to be detained wrongfully by the police in other countries. See generally
Charles R. Both, International Police Force or Tool for Harassment of Human Rights Defenders and Political Adversaries: Interpol’s Rift with the Human Rights Community, 8 ILSA J.
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criminal prosecution or deport Arar to Canada, U.S. authorities deported
Arar to Syria; they delivered him into the custody of the Syrian Military
Intelligence Service, where the likelihood of human rights abuses was
high, to say the least. Although this example of the post-September 11
practice of extraordinary renditions falls outside the scope of this Article,
it bears mentioning. It underscores the consequences of bad Canadian
intelligence in the hands of another country’s intelligence agency that
failed to respect not simply privacy but human rights more generally.
The Canadian Commission of Inquiry aptly dubbed these liberty
dangers the “ripple effect” of transnational information sharing. It is
worthwhile repeating in full the lessons drawn by the Commission from
Mr. Arar’s case:
[S]haring information from investigations in Canada with other
countries can have a “ripple effect” beyond Canada’s borders,
with consequences that may not be controllable from within
Canada. The legal power of Canadian courts and governments to
require respect of constitutional rights and freedoms is exercised
within Canada’s territorial borders. Once a person or information moves outside of Canada, it becomes difficult to ensure
treatment of that person or information in accordance with Canadian constitutional rights and values . . . .
Canadian investigators may receive and act upon information
from other countries. Use of this information may have significant personal consequences for individuals in Canada and their
associates such as investigation, surveillance, arrest or prosecution. In some instances, such information may have been
acquired in ways inconsistent with rights and freedoms protected
here. For example, it may have been obtained through torture or
other unacceptable investigation techniques, or in the absence of
checks and balances to ensure reliability.46
The Commission therefore recommended establishing an independent review body with the power to conduct privacy and civil liberties
investigations and to hear individual complaints. This review body would
have jurisdiction only over the RCMP’s national security activities.
Int’l & Comp. L. 357 (2002). In other words, law enforcement agencies that use information
on their citizens to harass them at home have taken advantage of the Interpol network to harass them abroad. Similarly, member countries might legitimately request additional
information on criminal suspects through the notice system, but the identification of suspects
might lead receiving member countries not only to, say, search their criminal databases for
entries under the suspect’s name, but also to engage in illegitimate, illiberal harassment of
those suspects.
46.
Arar Commission: Analysis and Recommendations, supra note 29, at 431.
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Oversight of other intelligence agencies would be left to other government watchdogs.47 One important task of the review body would be to
guarantee that the RCMP’s privacy protocols were strictly followed in
48
exchanging information with domestic and foreign agencies, and that
special policies were developed—and followed—when sending or re49
ceiving information from countries with poor human rights records.

VI. Redesigning Transnational Intelligence
Networks to Protect Privacy
Europe contains useful insights for protecting innocent individuals
like Maher Arar caught in the web of transnational intelligence gathering. The European experience with government by network, including
intelligence networks, is the longest and richest of any region in the
50
world. That is because European integration has proceeded not through
the transfer of national sovereignty to a federal center, but through the
sharing and pooling of sovereignty in the network form of governance.
With this experience comes a host of institutional and legal mechanisms
for promoting rights and democratic accountability in transnational networks.
Although these mechanisms have not always succeeded, European
legislators have had ample opportunity to experiment with institutional
design, particularly with regard to safeguarding the right to information
privacy. In contrast with the United States, where information privacy is
recognized only as a statutory, not a constitutional right, in Europe information privacy is considered a fundamental right no less vital than
more traditional rights such as freedom of expression and the right to
property.51 Therefore, when establishing transnational networks, European legislators are under a constitutional duty to protect the right to
information privacy.

47.
Id. at 503.
48.
Id. at 521.
49.
Id. at 522.
50.
Cf. Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: The Case of
the European Information Privacy Network, 26 Mich. J. Int’l. L. 807, 813–19 (2005).
51.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 26, art. 8. See, e.g., Rotaru v. Romania, 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 156 (2000) (holding that
storage and use of personal information in a police file, together with refusal of right of correction, amounts to interference with private life under Article 8); Leander v. Sweden, 116
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 124 (1987) (holding that recordation in a secret register coupled with
a refusal to allow review and refutation constitutes interference with private life under Article
8); Malone v. United Kingdom, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 289 (1984) (holding that open
registers constitute an interference with private life under Article 8).
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There are a number of intelligence networks in Europe. Three
prominent examples were mentioned earlier: Europol, Schengen, and an
EU law on information exchange among national police forces. Of these,
Europol offers the best illustration of the different possibilities for safeguarding privacy in transnational networks whose reach extends beyond
Europe. Because Europol is a self-contained system, privacy rights are
built directly into it rather than scattered throughout the different laws,
regulations, and judicial decisions of the European Union. Furthermore,
as a form of network that relies both on the nodes and the center to provide intelligence, privacy must be protected in the work of both actors—
the participating national agencies and the central office. As a result, the
privacy architecture of Europol is the most comprehensive of all three
networks.
Under the Europol Convention, both national police authorities and
the central office are held to data protection standards. The Convention
requires each national participant to adopt the standards of the Council
of Europe Convention on Personal Data Processing into its domestic
law.52 Without implementation, a state cannot enter information into or
extract information from the Europol system. In other words, without a
regulatory scheme for information privacy, that state is denied access to
an extremely valuable resource in fighting cross-border crime. To guarantee privacy compliance by national police, each state is required to
establish an independent national supervisory body with adequate oversight powers.53 Similarly, the network center—the central office in The
Hague—is bound by the privacy principles of the Council of Europe Convention on Personal Data Processing.54 Compliance at the center is
likewise guaranteed by a special-purpose independent supervisory body
established under the Europol Convention and known as the Joint Supervisory Body.55
The network nodes and the network center are also held to a number
of specific data protection guarantees articulated in the Europol Convention. As explained earlier, Europol is responsible for three different sets
of information: the EIS, work files created to assist with specific national
investigations, and an index system designed to make the information in
the work files readily available. Under the Europol Convention, such
56
information may only be used to combat specifically listed crimes. The

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 14.
Id. art. 23.
Id. art. 14.3.
Id. art. 24.
Id. art. 8.
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party that inputs personal data into one of the systems must also ensure
that the data is accurate and up-to-date.57
Information in the different systems may be retained only as long as
necessary to accomplish the crime-fighting purposes for which it was
originally entered into the system. In fact, the Convention goes further: it
establishes a specific three-year baseline for retention of personal data.
Every three years, the national authorities responsible for entering information into the EIS must review that information to guarantee that it
is still serving the original investigative purpose. If a national authority
fails to make a decision in favor of retention, the information is automatically deleted from the EIS. By contrast, the information contained in
work files and cross-referenced in the index system must be deleted after
three years. That three-year period, however, may be renewed if the Director of Europol finds the information “strictly necessary” for the
criminal investigation that originally led to the creation of the work file.58
Indeed, when a work file is initially created, the Joint Supervisory Authority has the power to review the file to ensure that the planned
collection and analysis of personal information accords with privacy
principles.59
Individuals have a right to check on their information to learn
whether they are covered by any of Europol’s three systems. If such information exists, individuals have the right to have any inaccurate
information corrected or, if it was collected and processed in contravention of data protection principles other than accuracy, to have it deleted.
Individuals must file such requests with their national data protection
body, which then forwards the requests to Europol. After checking the
information, Europol replies directly to the individual, who can appeal to
the Joint Supervisory Body if she is not satisfied with the reply.60 The
Europol Convention contains yet another privacy guarantee: to facilitate
oversight by the Joint Supervisory Body, retrievals of personal information by the central office from the three systems must be recorded. In the
case of the EIS, each retrieval must be documented; in the case of the
other two systems, one out of every ten retrievals, at a minimum, must
57.
Id. art. 15.
58.
Id. art. 21, amended by Council Act of 27 November 2003 drawing up, on the Basis
of Article 43(1) of the Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol
Convention), a Protocol Amending that Convention, 2004 O.J. (C 2) 1.
59.
Id. art. 12.
60.
Id. arts. 19–20. See, e.g., Europol Joint Supervisory Body, The Second Activity Report of the Europol Joint Supervisory Body 21–26 (2005), available at http://
europoljsb.consilium.europa.eu/documents/45EA1FE4-5DAA-41ED-9356FA169E5B0800.pdf; Europol Joint Supervisory Body, Europol Activity Report 38–42
(2003), available at http://europoljsb.consilium.europa.eu/documents/12FE0898-A493-4E30A2D7-D606D2D3C280.pdf.
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be documented. Lastly, national authorities and the central office are
required to implement technical measures to protect Europol’s informa62
tion systems against unauthorized use and to enable recordkeeping.
These specific provisions should be familiar from the earlier discussion of national information privacy law. The limitation on the purposes
for which personal information may be used, the requirement of accuracy, the specification of a time period for data retention, and the need
for security measures all have their equivalents in national law. Likewise,
the different oversight mechanisms—the right to check on personal information held by Europol and independent supervisory bodies—have
national counterparts.
A second type of data protection guarantee was created in the Europol Convention, applicable not to the immediate circle of network
participants but to an outer circle of nonsignatory states. Under the Europol Convention, personal information may be transferred to third
countries to assist with specific investigations involving terrorism, drug
trafficking, counterfeiting, and any of the other crimes covered by the
Convention. Third countries, however, must ensure an adequate level of
data protection before personal information may be transferred.63 Adequacy does not signify an identical set of privacy rights, but it does entail
legislation that broadly tracks the guarantees of the Council of Europe
Convention on Personal Data Processing and that is subject to enforcement by an independent government body. Only in “exceptional cases,”
in which the Director of Europol considers the transfer of personal information “absolutely necessary to safeguard the essential interests of
the Member States,” or “in the interests of preventing imminent danger
associated with crime,” can the requirement of adequacy be waived.64 On
the receiving end, when information is received from third countries, it
must be checked independently by Europol’s central office for reliability
and lawfulness.65
Europol’s laws and practices illustrate two fundamentally different
sets of privacy guarantees available to intelligence networks. First, all
participants can be required to adhere to the same multilateral privacy
standards. Those standards might be written into the agreement on intelligence exchange or contained in an international instrument distinct
61.
Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 16.
62.
Id. art. 25.
63.
Id. art. 18.
64.
Id., amended by Council Act of 27 November 2003 Drawing Up, on the Basis of
Article 43(1) of the Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol
Convention), a Protocol Amending that Convention, 2004 O.J. (C 2) 1.
65.
Id. art. 15; Council Act of 3 November 1998 Laying Down Rules Concerning the
Receipt of Information by Europol from Third Parties, 1999 O.J. (C 26) 17.
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from the agreement. The Europol Convention makes use of both possibilities: the parties must implement the general guarantees of the Council
of Europe Convention on Personal Data Processing as well as the specific provisions of the Europol Convention. Once all the parties adhere to
these same privacy standards, information can be exchanged freely. In
fact, under the Europol Convention and similar agreements, the parties
are under a duty to share information that can assist the other parties in
preventing crime and threats to national security. In addition, the network center—Europol’s central office—is subject to nearly identical
privacy duties.
Second, each network participant can unilaterally adopt privacy
norms and unilaterally enforce those norms against sub-standard network participants. Before one network party transfers information to
another network party, it may require that privacy assurances be given by
the receiving party. Likewise, when one network party receives information from another network party, it may independently guarantee the
reliability and lawfulness of that information. This is the mechanism created in the Europol Convention for relations with third countries, the
outer-circle of the information-exchange network. Indeed, this form of
unilateral enforcement of privacy standards by domestic intelligence
agencies was recommended by the Canadian Commission of Inquiry to
avert another case such as Arar’s.66
The disadvantages of this second type of privacy guarantee are obvious: each privacy-abiding party to an intelligence network is required to
review routinely the privacy arrangements of the other parties to the
network with whom information is shared. Such privacy checks can stall
the free exchange of information on serious crime and terrorism, the
very raison d’être of such networks. A multilateral instrument, therefore,
would appear to be a preferable mechanism for guaranteeing privacy in
the work of intelligence networks.

VII. Conclusion
Liberal societies that permit their governments to conduct free–
ranging surveillance risk sinking rapidly into illiberalism. That much is
part of the philosophical and legal canon of liberal democracy. The danger of surveillance through the collection and combination of electronic
data is also widely perceived—albeit somewhat more dimly—than that
66.
See Arar Commission: Analysis and Recommendations, supra note 29, at 101–
27, 343–44 (recommending that Canadian information privacy guarantees be imposed on
information transferred to U.S. intelligence agencies); id. at 344 (recommending that caution
be used in information transfers to or from countries with questionable human rights records).
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of surveillance through conventional means. But the consequences of
globalization for government surveillance and liberal rights are poorly
understood. How does the right to privacy fare in today’s borderless
world of national security threats and networked spy agencies?
The answer to this question requires a careful assessment of both the
values underpinning the right to privacy and the nature of transnational
intelligence networks. Through privacy, liberal societies advance a number of goals: avoiding wrongful government determinations based on
unreliable information, preventing the use of personal information for
purposes of suppressing basic rights, and, most fundamentally, promoting individual autonomy. Whenever government agencies collect,
combine, and utilize personal information, these privacy interest are put
at risk. But the sharing of intelligence transnationally raises special concerns. Foremost among these is the danger that one or more of the state
parties to the intelligence network will fail to respect privacy and other
basic liberties. If only one of the many different national agencies that
exchange personal information breaches privacy, the rights of citizens
everywhere are compromised.
One place to look for a constructive response to the liberal flaw of
transnational networks is Europe. For a number of years, police and intelligence agencies have exchanged information as members of Europewide networks. In these networks, two types of privacy safeguards have
been adopted: multilateral standards, to which all the network parties
must adhere, and unilateral standards, applicable under the law of only
one of the parties and enforced against all the other parties by erecting
barriers to information exchange with sub-standard parties. Because
multilateral standards both promote government cooperation and advance liberal rights, they appear to hold the greatest promise for
networks that extend beyond Europe.
Of course, it might not be possible to agree on common privacy
standards or, even assuming agreement, guarantee effective implementation of such standards at the national level. It is well known that the
United States and the European Union differ on a number of important
points of privacy law, with the European Union favoring stricter limitations on government use of personal information. Furthermore, even
though states might sign up to information privacy standards, they might
not implement or enforce them, a problem common to many international human rights regimes.
Notwithstanding these obstacles, given the critical public mission of
transnational intelligence networks, it seems well worth the effort to attempt to reach consensus on privacy norms. After all, it is hard to
disagree with the fundamental purposes of information privacy. Who
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objects to preventing wrongful determinations based on unreliable information, protecting liberal rights from officious government meddling,
and defending individual autonomy from Orwellian government surveillance? It does not seem far-fetched to think that, in the future, agreement
might be reached on the law necessary to promote such liberal aims in
the networked world of government intelligence gathering.

